Estimation risk occurs when individuals form beliefs about parameters that are unknown. We examine how auditors respond to the estimation risk that arises when they form beliefs about the likelihood of client bankruptcy. We argue that auditors are likely to become more conservative when facing higher estimation risk because they are risk-averse. We find that estimation risk is of first-order importance in explaining auditor behavior. In particular, auditors are more likely to issue going-concern opinions, are more likely to resign, and charge higher audit fees when the standard errors surrounding the point estimates of bankruptcy are larger. To our knowledge, this is the first study to quantify estimation risk using the variancecovariance matrix of coefficient estimates taken from a statistical prediction model.
Introduction
Many accounting variables represent estimates of future outcomes. For example, the bad debt expense, pension liabilities, and depreciation expense all reflect managers' estimates of the future. In fact, many accounting variables are labeled as estimates, such as earnings forecasts and estimated contingent liabilities. Therefore decision-making under conditions of uncertainty is of fundamental importance in accounting. When individuals make predictions they must form beliefs about unknown parameters (Von Neumann and Morgenstern 1967) .
This entails estimation risk. Estimation risk matters because it alters the behavior of risk-averse individuals (Klein and Bawa 1976) . This study shows that estimation risk has a large impact on the degree of conservatism exhibited by risk-averse auditors.
We focus on the estimation risk associated with predicting bankruptcy because auditors can incur substantial losses from litigation and reputation impairment when their clients file for bankruptcy (Palmrose 1987; Carcello and Palmrose 1994; Lys and Watts 1994; U.S. House of Representatives 1985 , 1990 Firth 1990; Weil 2001 ; House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs 2011). These losses mean that it is important for auditors to form accurate expectations about the likelihood of bankruptcy. Estimation risk arises because the probability that a client will file for bankruptcy is not known. Instead, the probability must be estimated.
The level of estimation risk captures the degree of imprecision in the point estimates of bankruptcy. We argue that estimation risk is likely to have a significant impact on auditor behavior because auditors are risk averse.
To clarify the distinction between bankruptcy risk and estimation risk, it is helpful to introduce some notation. Let * represent the risk that a company will file for bankruptcy in the future, where * is uncertain and therefore must be estimated. Let ̂ * represent the best point estimate of * . We measure estimation risk using the standard errors of the point estimates, ( (̂ * )), because the standard errors reflect the precision of each point estimate. In are risk averse, it is far from obvious that estimation risk will have an economically significant impact on their behavior. The ( (̂ * )) variable is a second-moment risk because it measures the estimation uncertainty surrounding the point estimates of bankruptcy. In contrast, ̂ * is a first-moment risk because it measures the point estimates of bankruptcy. While prior research has shown that the first moment (̂ * ) has an economically significant impact on auditor behavior, it is unclear whether the second moment ( (̂ * )) also has an economically significant impact.
Our empirical analysis begins by estimating bankruptcy prediction models, which yield the point estimates of bankruptcy (̂ * ) and the standard errors surrounding the point estimates ( (̂ * )) for each observation in the sample. The covariates in the bankruptcy models include measures of financial distress, such as profitability, leverage, liquidity, stock returns, return volatility, age, institutional ownership, and distance to default that are commonly used in bankruptcy prediction studies (e.g., Bharat and Shumway 2008; Beaver et al. 2012) . Next, we confirm the evidence from prior research that the point estimates of bankruptcy risk, ̂ * , affect auditors' going-concern decisions, resignation decisions, and audit fees. In particular, auditors are more likely to issue going-concern opinions, are more likely to resign, and charge higher audit fees when companies are more likely to go bankrupt. 3 We then test our three hypotheses relating to the incremental effect of estimation risk.
First, we test whether estimation risk ( (̂ * )) explains auditors' going-concern reporting decisions. Consistent with our first hypothesis, we find highly significant positive coefficients on (̂ * ) in the going-concern reporting models. This is consistent with risk-averse auditors issuing more conservative audit reports when there is higher estimation risk. Second, we test 3 There is evidence that audit firms use bankruptcy prediction models to assess companies' financial health (Eidleman 1995; Johnstone et al. 2016, p. 677) . Even if an audit firm does not formally use a bankruptcy prediction model, we expect that the point estimates and standard errors are likely to correlate with auditors' rational beliefs about the expected likelihood of bankruptcy and the uncertainty that surrounds this likelihood.
whether estimation risk ( (̂ * )) incrementally explains auditors' resignation decisions. We find that (̂ * ) is positively and significantly related to resignations. That is, auditors are more likely to resign when there is more uncertainty surrounding the point estimates of bankruptcy. Finally, consistent with our third hypothesis, we show that auditors charge significantly higher audit fees when estimation risk is higher.
Although the ( (̂ * )) variable is a second-moment risk, we show that it has an economically significant impact on auditor behavior. For instance, we calculate the likelihood of an auditor issuing a going-concern opinion as (̂ * ) increases from the tenth percentile to the ninetieth percentile, holding all other variables (including the point estimates) constant. As (̂ * ) increases over this range, the likelihood of a going-concern opinion increases approximately threefold, from 2.6 percent to 7.5 percent. Similarly, the likelihood of an auditor resignation approximately doubles as (̂ * ) increases from the tenth percentile to the ninetieth percentile. Audit fees increase by 7.4 percent as (̂ * ) increases from its tenth percentile value to the ninetieth percentile. Thus estimation risk is of fundamental importance in understanding the behavior of auditors under conditions of uncertainty.
In a supplementary analysis, we argue that estimation risk matters more when companies are moderately distressed, rather than when they are financially healthy or severely distressed. This is becasuse an auditor is more likely to worry about the imprecision in the point estimates of bankruptcy when a company has a moderate level of distress. Consistent with this, we find that (̂ * ) ) significantly explains auditors' going-concern reporting decisions, their resignation decisions, and audit fees when companies are moderately distressed.
In contrast, (̂ * )) is a weak or insignificant predictor of auditor behavior when companies are financially healthy or severely distressed. These findings reinforce our main result that auditors act conservatively in situations where estimation risk is likely to matter most.
This study makes two contributions to the literature. First, we contribute to the auditing literature by showing that auditors are more conservative when they are faced with higher estimation risk. Prior studies examine how auditor behavior is affected by the point estimates of bankruptcy. 4 We show that auditors also respond to the estimation risk that surrounds the point estimates. Thus it is not only the point estimates of bankruptcy (̂ * ) that matter but also the uncertainty that surrounds the point estimates ( (̂ * )). This is consistent with our theory that risk-averse auditors respond to elevated levels of estimation risk.
Second, our study is the first to quantify estimation risk using the variance-covariance matrix of coefficient estimates taken from a statistical prediction model. In prior research, estimation risk has been measured using the volatility in past realizations of the variable whose future value is to be predicted. For example, the volatility of past earnings has been used to measure the uncertainty that managers face when they forecast future earnings (e.g., Waymire 1985) . In many settings, however, estimation risk cannot be inferred from past volatility. For example, there is zero volatility in past bankruptcy outcomes for a company that has never previously gone bankrupt, but this does not mean there is zero estimation risk when estimating the company's future risk of bankruptcy. Even if a company has never gone bankrupt, there is significant uncertainty when predicting whether the company will go bankrupt. Therefore past realizations of the dependent variable are not always reliable for inferring estimation risk. We show that estimation risk can easily be calculated using the variance-covariance matrix of coefficient estimates together with company characteristics. We expect that our approach can be used in many other accounting settings where estimation risk is expected to affect the behavior of risk-averse agents. 4 Research shows that the point estimates of bankruptcy risk are highly significant in explaining the auditor's decision to issue a going-concern opinion (Mutchler 1985; Dopuch et al. 1987; Carcello and Neal 2000; DeFond et al. 2002; Carcello et al. 2009) or to resign from the engagement (Krishnan and Krishnan 1997; Ghosh and Tang 2015) .
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section develops the three hypotheses. The third section describes the research design, and the fourth section presents the sample and reports our main results. Section five reports the results from several supplementary analyses. Section six concludes.
Hypotheses
Prior research demonstrates that auditor behavior is affected by the point estimates of bankruptcy risk. For example, the audit reporting literature points out that auditors issue goingconcern opinions when the point estimates of bankruptcy risk are higher (Mutchler 1985; Dopuch et al. 1987; Carcello and Neal 2000; DeFond et al. 2002; Carcello et al. 2009 ).
Similarly, research on auditor resignations shows that bankruptcy risk is a key determinant of an auditor's decision to resign from an engagement (Krishnan and Krishnan 1997; Ghosh and Tang 2015 ).
An auditor faces the prospect of incurring losses (L) if its client enters bankruptcy.
These losses occur because client bankruptcy increases the likelihood of an auditor being sued or incurring reputation losses (Palmrose 1987; Carcello and Palmrose 1994; Lys and Watts 1994; U.S. House of Representatives 1985 , 1990 Firth 1990; Weil 2001; House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs 2011). Even if an auditor is certain about the amount of loss, L, there is some estimation risk because the auditor does not know for sure the client's probability of bankruptcy. Instead, the auditor must estimate the probability, which is the source of estimation risk.
For example, suppose the probability of bankruptcy is unknown but is believed to be either p1 or p2. If the true bankruptcy probability is p1, the auditor's expected loss from bankruptcy is p1 L; on the other hand, if the true bankruptcy probability is p2, the auditor's expected loss from bankruptcy is p2 L. Estimation risk occurs because the auditor does not know for sure whether the likelihood of bankruptcy is p1 or p2. Thus the auditor is unsure whether the expected loss from bankruptcy is p1 L or p2 L. In this simple example, a larger difference between p1 and p2 represents greater estimation risk. There is zero estimation risk when p1 = p2 because, in this situation, the auditor knows that the true probability of bankruptcy is p1 = p2.
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Without loss of generality, assume a 50:50 chance that p1 is the true probability of bankruptcy and a 50:50 chance that p2 is the true probability of bankruptcy. As p1 and p2 are equally likely, the best point estimate of the probability of bankruptcy is simply (p1 + p2)/2.
Borrowing from the economics literature, we refer to (p1 + p2)/2 as the "certainty equivalent" bankruptcy probability. In turn, the auditor's certainty equivalent expected loss from
The utility function of a risk-averse auditor is illustrated in Figure 1 . The auditor's utility is a declining function of the expected loss from bankruptcy (i.e., the utility function has a negative slope, U'(.) < 0). Furthermore, the auditor's utility is declining at an increasing rate because the auditor is assumed to be risk averse (i.e., U''(.) < 0). As shown in Figure 1 , the assumption of risk aversion is equivalent to assuming that U((p1 + p2)L/2) > 0.5 U(p1L) + 0.5 U(p2L). In other words, the auditor obtains higher utility when there is no estimation risk (i.e., when the auditor knows for sure that the expected loss is (p1 + p2)L/2), compared with when the auditor is unsure whether the expected loss is p1L or p2L).
The theoretical literature in economics shows that risk-averse individuals are willing to buy insurance to reduce the magnitude of the loss, L. Similarly, we expect that risk-averse auditors take steps to mitigate the losses associated with client bankruptcy (L). In particular, auditors can mitigate the losses (i.e., reduce the magnitude of L) in three ways: a) issuing goingconcern opinions, b) resigning, and c) exerting greater effort.
We note that these conservative auditor responses are costly (just as purchasing insurance is costly). Issuing a going-concern opinion is costly because it increases the likelihood of client dismissal. Resigning is costly because the auditor ceases to earn fees from the client. Exerting more effort is also costly. While these strategies are costly, they are beneficial in terms of reducing the losses associated with client bankruptcy (i.e., they reduce the magnitude of L). Our main insight is that risk-averse auditors are more likely to adopt these risk-management strategies when estimation risk is higher.
Estimation risk makes it harder to predict whether a company will survive or go bankrupt. Therefore, when faced with greater estimation risk, a risk-averse auditor will err on the side of caution by being more likely to issue a going-concern opinion. This leads to our first hypothesis. rather than full, coverage. Moreover, while audit firms can insure against the losses from litigation, they cannot insure against the losses from damage to their reputations. Therefore reputational concerns will tend to make them more risk averse.
In addition, there are limitations to using portfolio diversification for risk management.
First, audit firms' portfolios may not be fully diversified, as these firms specialize in certain types of clients to develop reputations for expertise. Second, the client portfolio of an individual partner is much less diversified than the client portfolio of the partner's audit firm. Therefore an individual partner is likely to be risk averse due to undiversified client-specific risks. 6 While an audit firm would want its partners to act in the best interests of the firm, in practice, many decisions are delegated to individual partners because audit firms cannot perfectly monitor the actions of individual partners. Consistent with firms delegating key decisions to partners, empirical research finds that audit outcomes are significantly affected by the characteristics of individual partners (Gul et al. 2013; Knechel et al. 2015) . Moreover, partners are compensated based on the outcomes of their own audits as well as the audits of the entire firm (Knechel et al. 2013) . Therefore audit outcomes are likely to be shaped by partners' own risk preferences as well as the risk preferences of their firms. point from the centroid of the X variables (i.e., the first and third terms in ̂̂ ′), where these distances are weighted by the variances of the coefficients on the X variables (i.e., the second term in ̂̂ ′). In contrast, the point estimates (̂ * ) capture the distance of a data point from the centroid of the X variables (the second term in ̂ ), where these distances are weighted by the coefficients on the X variables (the first term in ̂ ). Therefore bankruptcy risk (̂ * ) and estimation risk (SE(̂ * )) are conceptually distinct (and in our sample they are negatively correlated with each other (e.g., Z has large losses but also has low leverage). In this example, there is more uncertainty surrounding Z's point estimate of bankruptcy because Z's large losses suggest high bankruptcy risk, whereas Z's low leverage suggests low bankruptcy risk.
Next, Figure 2 shows how estimation risk (SE(̂ * )) affects the utilty function of a riskaverse auditor. Note that Figure 2 shows the point estimates of bankruptcy (̂ * ) and the standard errors of the point estimates (SE(̂ * )), rather than the predicted bankruptcy probabilities () and the standard errors of the predicted probabilities (SE()). 8 This is because it is possible to calculate the standard errors of ̂ * using the variance-covariance matrix of the coefficient estimates as described above, whereas it is not possible to compute the standard errors of the predicted probabilities of bankruptcy (SE()).
To illustrate the difference between a point estimate and the standard error surrounding the point estimate, the top part of Figure 2 shows two companies, Z and Y, that have the same point estimates of bankruptcy (i.e., they share the same value for ̂ * ) but their standard errors are different. In Figure 2 , company Z's point estimate has a standard error of 1.50, whereas Y's point estimate has a standard error of 1.00. This means the distribution has fatter tails for company Z than Y, so there is greater uncertainty surrounding the point estimate for Z (i.e., Z has higher estimation risk than Y). Theoretically, a risk-averse auditor would care about the distribution of estimated bankruptcy risks as well as the best point estimate, ̂ * . In other words, a risk-averse auditor would care about SE(̂ * ) as well as ̂ * .
[
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]
For example, consider the upper and lower confidence limits for companies Z and Y.
At the 95% confidence level (two-tailed), the upper confidence limit (UCL) equals the point estimate plus 1.96 multiplied by the standard error of the point estimate (i.e., UCL = ̂ * + 1.96
× SE(̂ * ). Likewise, the lower confidence limit (LCL) equals the point estimate minus 1.96 multiplied by the standard error of the point estimate (i.e., LCL = ̂ *  1.96 × SE(̂ * ). As shown in Figure 2 , company Z has a higher UCL and a lower LCL compared with company Y because Z has a higher value of SE(̂ * ); i.e., Z has higher estimation risk.
Importantly, the bottom part of Figure 2 links estimation risk back to the utlity function of a risk-averse auditor. In particular, the utility function of a risk-averse auditor has the property that decreases in utility (ΔU) for a given increase in the expected loss (ΔE(Loss)) are increasing in the size of the expected loss (E(Loss)). Therefore the change in utility for an equal change in the expected loss (ΔE(Loss1) = ΔE (Loss2)) is greater for the upper confidence limit, compared with the lower confidence limit (i.e., ΔU2 > ΔU1 in Figure 2 ). For a formal proof in the context of risk-averse investors, please see Hanoch and Levy (1969) .
The key takeaway is that estimation risk provides risk-averse auditors with stronger incentives to mitigate the losses associated with client bankruptcy (i.e., L). We argue that auditors can mitigate these losses by being more likely to issue going-concern opinions (H1), more likely to resign (H2), and by charging higher audit fees (H3). In Figure 2 , this means that the auditor is more likely to issue a going-concern opinion (or resign or charge higher audit fees) to company Z rather than company Y because company Z has greater estimation risk than company Y.
Estimation risk and going-concern opinions
In studies of going-concern reporting, the following type of model is estimated:
where GC* ≥ 0 if GC = one and GC* < 0 if GC = zero. The GC variable equals one if the company receives a going-concern modification in the auditor's report and zero otherwise. In eq. (2), the ̂ * variable captures the point estimates of bankruptcy risk. The literature finds that the point estimates are highly significant in explaining auditors' decisions to issue goingconcern opinions (Mutchler 1985; Dopuch et al. 1987; Carcello and Neal 2000; DeFond et al. 2002; Carcello et al. 2009 ). Therefore we expect a significant positive coefficient on ̂ * in eq.
(2) (i.e., 1 > 0). The ZGC and AGC variables capture company and auditor characteristics that explain going-concern reporting. (The ZGC and AGC variables are discussed in more detail below.) Eq. (2) is estimated with year and industry fixed effects.
To test H1, we augment eq. (2) as follows:
Under H1, an auditor is more likely to issue a going-concern opinion when there is greater estimation risk. We therefore predict a positive coefficient on (̂ * ) in eq. (3); i.e., 2 > 0.
Estimation risk and auditor resignations
The research design for testing H2 is similar to that of H1. 
Under H2, an auditor is more likely to resign when there is greater estimation risk. We therefore predict a positive coefficient on (̂ * ) in eq. (4); i.e., 2 > 0. We also expect the coefficient on ̂ * to be positive (i.e., 1 > 0), as auditors are more likely to resign when the point estimates of bankruptcy are larger (Krishnan and Krishnan 1997; Ghosh and Tang 2015) .
Estimation risk and audit fees
We test H3 by estimating an audit fee model, where the dependent variable is the natural log of audit fees (Ln(AF)). The ZF and AF variables capture company and auditor charactertisitcs that explain audit fees. The audit fee model is:
Under H3, an auditor charges higher audit fees when there is greater estimation risk.
We therefore predict a positive coefficient on (̂ * ) in eq. (5).
The independent variables in the bankruptcy model (X)
We generate ̂ * and (̂ * ) by estimating the bankruptcy prediction model in eq. (1):
Our choice of X variables closely follows prior research on bankruptcy prediction. That said, there are many bankruptcy prediction studies, and the set of independent variables varies from study to study. We select the variables that are commonly found in the literature, while keeping the bankruptcy model reasonably parsimonious to avoid excessive sample attrition.
Prior studies find that accounting variables predict bankruptcy (Ohlson 1980; Zmijewski 1984; Beaver et al. 2012) . Our accounting variables comprise a LOSS indicator (equal to one if a company reports losses and zero otherwise), a LEVERAGE ratio (total debt divided by total assets), a profitability measure (ROA, computed as net income divided by total assets), and a LIQUIDITY ratio (current assets divided by current liabilities) In addition, we control for company size using the natural log of market value (LMV).
Failing companies tend to have poor stock market returns and high return volatility before they file for bankruptcy (Aharony et al. 1980; Shumway 2001; Beaver et al. 2005; Campbell et al. 2008; Beaver et al. 2012) . We therefore include a company's buy-and-hold return over the fiscal year (RET) and the standard deviation of returns over the fiscal year (STDEV). We also control for company age (AGE) and institutional ownership (INSTOWN).
In addition, we include the distance to default (DD) measure of Bharat and Shumway (2008) . Finally, we include indicator variables for each year of the sample period (1995-2013) to control for temporal variation in bankruptcy.
3.5 Control variables in the going-concern reporting models (ZGC and AGC )
We include company-specific variables in eqs. (2) and (3) to control for known determinants of going-concern reporting (e.g., DeFond et al. 2002; Francis and Yu, 2009) . The LTA variable is the natural log of total assets. Book-to-market is the book value of equity 9 To compute DD, we follow the approach outlined in Bharat and Shumway (2008) (which is also consistent with Correa, Richardson, and Tuna, 2012) . In particular, we generate the DD measure by solving the following equation:
where E = the market value of equity; D = the face value of debt (computed as the sum of short-term debt and half of the reported value of long-term debt); rit-1 is past year equity returns; = total volatility of the firm computed as
where is the volatility of firm equity and is the volatility of firm's debt; is calculated using the standard deviation of stock returns in the past one year; and is calculated as 0.05 + 0.25* .
divided by the market value of equity. Leverage equals total debt divided by total assets. LLoss is one if the company reports a loss in the previous year (zero otherwise). ROA is net income divided by total assets. Cash flows is operating cash flows divided by total assets. Liquidity is current assets divided by current liabilities. Ret is the buy-and-hold raw return over the fiscal year, while Stdev is the standard deviation of returns over the fiscal year. New finance is an indicator variable equal to one when there is an increase of 20 percent or more in long-term debt or common equity in the subsequent year (zero otherwise). Investment is short-term investment securities (including cash and cash equivalents) deflated by total assets, and
Reporting lag is the number of days between the fiscal year-end and the earnings announcement date.
We also include auditor-specific controls commonly used in going-concern reporting research to capture the effects of auditor quality, expertise, and independence (e.g., Francis and Yu 2009; Huang and Scholz 2012) . We control for auditor size (Big), where Big equals one if the company is audited by a Big Four firm (zero otherwise). We also control for the length of tenure between the company and audit firm (Tenure), whether a company is audited by an industry specialist (Ind_spec), the ratio of audit fees to total assets (AF_ratio), the ratio of nonaudit fees to total fees (NAF_ratio), and whether a company received a going-concern opinion in the prior year (LagGC).
Finally, auditors may have proprietary information that is relevant to assessing the client's risk of bankruptcy, and this information could affect the auditor's decision to issue a going-concern opinion. However, Gerakos et al. (2016) find that auditors' going-concern opinions do not predict more bankruptices compared to a statsitical model based on public data. Nonetheless, we control for an auditor's private information about the risk of bankruptcy by including the ex post bankruptcy dummy (B) as an additional control variable.
Control variables in the auditor resignation models (ZR and AR)
The company-specific control variables in eq. (4) are based on research on auditor resignations (Krishnan and Krishnan 1997; Huang and Scholz 2012) . They include LTA, Book-to-market, ROA, Cash flows, and Reporting lag. In addition, we control for restatements announced during the most recent fiscal year. The Restatement variable equals one if the company announces a restatement during the year and zero otherwise. We control for Special items, calculated as the ratio of special items to total assets, and Litigation risk, which equals one if the company is in the biotech (SIC codes 2833-2836 and 8731-8734), computer (3570-3577 and 7370-7374), electronics (3600-3674), or retail (5200-5961) industries (zero otherwise). We also control for the auditor-specific variables that are included in the models of going-concern reporting (Big, Tenure, Ind_spec, AF_ratio, NAF_ratio, and LagGC). Finally, we include the ex post bankruptcy dummy (B) as a control for the auditor's proprietary information.
Control variables in the audit fee models (ZF and AF)
We control for company and auditor variables that have been shown to explain audit fees (Larcker and Richardson 2004; Venkataraman, Weber, and Willenborg 2008; Hribar, Kravet, and Wilson 2014) . Our control variables capture size and complexity of the audit, audit risk, corporate events, and litigation risk. These control variables are LTA, Book-to-market, Leverage, ROA, LLoss, Liquidity, and Litigation risk. We further control for Rec (Receivables divided by total assets), Inv (Inventory divided by total assets), Merger (equals one if the company is engaged in a merger or acquisition and zero otherwise), IPO (equals one if the company is in the year of an initial public offering and zero otherwise), SEO (equals one if a company issues seasoned equity offering during the year and zero otherwise), and Issue (equals one if the company issues public debt during the year and zero otherwise). Busseg is the square root of the number of business segments of the company. Foreign is the percentage of foreign sales to total sales. Employee is the square root of employees (measured in thousands). Yearend equals one if a company's fiscal year-end is not in December. Our auditor-specific variables are Big, Tenure, and GC (GC = 1 if the auditor issues a going-concern opinion and zero otherwise). Finally, we include the ex post bankruptcy dummy (B) as a control for the auditor's proprietary information about the likelihood of bankruptcy.
Main results

Sample
The sample for the models of going-concern reporting, auditor resignations, and audit fees comprises SEC registrants over the period 2000 to 2013. Our starting point is 2000 because this is the first year data are available in the Audit Analytics database. The sample ends in 2013 to allow a subsequent two-year period in which to identify later bankruptcy events.
To generate the point estimates of bankruptcy (̂ * ) and the standard errors of the point estimates (SE(̂ * )), we estimate bankruptcy prediction models over rolling windows of the past five years. We use rolling windows because we use the point estimates and standard errors to explain auditors' out-of-sample behavior in the following year. For example, we estimate bankruptcy models for the five year period 1995-1999, and we use the resulting coefficients and standards errors to estimate ̂ * and SE(̂ * ) in the following year (2000) . We then use these values of ̂ * and SE(̂ * ) to explain auditors' going-concern reports, resignations, and audit fees in year 2000. Similarly, we estimate bankruptcy models for the five year period 1996-2000 to generate the values of ̂ * and SE(̂ * ) that are used to explain auditors' going-concern reports, resignations, and audit fees in 2001. Thus the sample for the bankruptcy prediction models is from 1995 to 2012.
The bankruptcy indicator (B) is taken from Chava (2014) . (Also see Chava and Jarrow 2004 and Campbell et al. 2008 .) It includes all bankruptcy filings (Chapters 7 or 11) recorded in The Wall Street Journal Index, the SDC database, SEC filings, and the CCH Capital Changes Reporter. We drop any audit reports or resignations that occur after the company files for bankruptcy. Returns data are from CRSP; institutional ownership data are from the Thomson Reuters 13-f filings database; corporate event data such as mergers and acquisitions, intitial public offerings, seasoned equity offerings, issuance of public debt are from SDC Platinum; data for other variables are from Compustat. Table 1 presents the annual incidence of bankruptcies, going-concern opinions, and auditor resignations. The mean value of B is 0.006, implying that the bankruptcy rate is 0.6% in our sample. The mean value of GC is 0.036, which means that 3.6% of audit opinions provide a warning about going-concern problems. The mean value of RESIGN indicates that auditors resign from 1.6% of their engagements. The mean value of audit fees is around $1.8 million.
Descriptive statistics
[ INSERT TABLE 1 Table 3 . 10 In almost every window, we find that a company is more likely to go bankrupt if it has higher leverage (z-stats. range from 1.57 to 10.31), reports losses (z-stats. range from 1.62 to 7.75), or has lower liquidity (z-stats. range from 2.48 to 4.87). The coefficients on RET are significantly negative (z-stats. range from 1.88 to 4.53), indicating that a company is more likely to go bankrupt if it has low stock returns. The coefficients on STDEV are positive (z-stats. range from 1.29 to 4.13), which means that a company is more likely to go bankrupt if it has higher return volatility. These findings are generally consistent with research on bankruptcy prediction (Aharony et al., 1980; Shumway, 2001; Beaver et al., 2005; Campbell et al., 2008; Beaver et al. 2012) . We also find significant negative coefficients on INSTOWN (z-stats. range from 2.67 to 6.71), indicating that companies with greater institutional ownership are less likely to go bankrupt. Finally, consistent with Bharat and Shumway (2008) , the coefficents on the DD measure are positive, although their significance varies over time (z-10 In some studies, bankruptcies are predicted using a hazard model (Shumway 2001; Beaver et al. 2005 ). The hazard model can be written as follows: ℎ( | ) = ℎ 0 ( ) × exp ( ), where ℎ( | ) is the hazard rate in year t, conditional on the values of X, ℎ 0 ( ) is the baseline hazard, while are the model parameters. The hazard model is semi-parametric because the baseline hazard, ℎ 0 ( ), is left unestimated (Cleves et al. 2004) . As ℎ 0 ( ) is not estimated, it is not possible to obtain point estimates or standard errors for the dependent variable, ℎ( | ). Accordingly, the hazard model is not suitable for examining estimation risk. In contrast, the logit model is fully parametric, and it is straightforward to obtain point estimates and standard errors. Accordingly, we follow bankruptcy prediction studies that use logit (e.g., Campbell et al. 2008 Next, we use the coefficient estimates from the bankruptcy prediction models to construct the point estimates of bankruptcy (i.e., ̂ * =̂ ). Likewise, we use the variancecovariance matrix (̂̂) to compute the standard errors surrounding each point estimate.
Descriptive statistics for the point estimates (̂ * ) and their standard errors (SE(̂ * )) are reported in Table 4 .
[INSERT are both equal to 6.89 (i.e., the sample median). Now consider how differences in estimation 11 The Altman (1968) and Ohlson (1980) bankruptcy models report pseudo R 2 s of 7 percent and 10 percent respectively. Likewise Campbell et al. (2008) obtain a pseudo R 2 of 11.4% in a model that predicts bankruptcy 12 months into the future (see their Table 4 ). Campbell et al. (2008) obtain higher pseudo R 2 s, ranging from 26 percent to 31 percent, when the bankruptcy horizon is just one month (see their Table 3 ). In our study, the bankruptcy horizon is 15 months rather than one month because an auditor is required to consider the likelihood of failure for a period of up to one year and the audit report can be issued up to three months after the fiscal yearend. Y's density function has thin tails). Accordingly, we expect that company Z's auditor is more likely to issue a going-concern opinion (H1), more likely to resign (H2), and charges higher audit fees (H3), compared with company Y's auditor, even though both companies have the same point estimates of bankruptcy.
4.4
Results from the models of going-concern reporting (H1) Table 5 presents results for the going-concern reporting models. In column (1), we begin by regressing going-concern opinions on the point estimates (̂ * ), the standard errors of the point estimates (SE(̂ * )), and control variables. Consistent with prior audit reporting studies, Table 5 finds a highly significant positive coefficient on the ̂ * variable (z-stat. = 16.90). That is, companies with higher point estimates of bankruptcy are more likely to receive goingconcern opinions.
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE]
Next, we turn to our main variable of interest, SE(̂ * ). Under H1, auditors respond to higher estimation risk by being more likely to issue going-concern opinions. Thus we predict a significant positive coefficient on SE(̂ * ). As shown in Table 5 , we do indeed find a highly significant positive coefficient on estimation risk (z-stat. = 10.67).
12 This is consistent with auditors increasing their propensity to issue going-concern opinions when estimation risk is higher.
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Not only are the results statistically significant, they are also significant in terms of their economic magnitude. To measure the economic importance of estimation risk, we calculate how the probability of issuing a going-concern opinion changes as (̂ * ) increases from the tenth percentile value to the ninetieth percentile, when all other variables including the point estimates of bankruptcy risk are held constant. As estimation risk increases over this range, the predicted probability of issuing a going-concern opinion increases approximately threefold, from 2.6 percent to 7.5 percent. Therefore estimation risk has a large impact on going-concern reporting. For the sake of comparison, we also calculate the going-concern probabilities as ̂ * increases from its tenth percentile value to the ninetieth percentile, with all other variables held constant. The likelihood of a going-concern opinion increases more than tenfold, from 0.4 percent to 7.2 percent, as ̂ * increases from its tenth percentile value to the ninetieth percentile.
Therefore the point estimates of bankruptcy have a larger impact on going-concern reporting than do the standard errors of the point estimates. The signs and significance of the control 12 Our results are similar if we estimate equation (3) without the ZGC variables. 13 In an untabulated test, we estimate an alternate version of model 1 by including all of the bankruptcy predictor variables (X) in the going-concern reporting model. In this specification, we are forced to drop the point estimate (̂ * ), as it is a linear function of the X variables, i.e., there is perfect multicollinearity between ̂ * and the X variables. The coefficients on estimation risk (SE(̂ * )) remain positive and highly significant. Therefore our results are robust to replacing ̂ * with the X variables.
variables in Table 5 are consistent with prior research on the determinants of going-concern reporting (e.g., Defond et al. 2002) .
In model 2, we additionally control for the ex post bankruptcy dummy (B) to check whether our inferences are affected by an auditor's properietary information about the likelihood of bankruptcy. After adding this control, we continue to find that estimation risk is a highly significant determinant of going-concern opinions (z-stat. = 10.23).
Overall we provide strong evidence that estimation risk positively affects auditors' going-concern reporting decisions.
4.5
Results from the models of auditor resignations (H2) Next, we turn to our main variable of interest, (̂ * ). Under H2, auditors respond to higher estimation risk by being more likely to resign. Thus we predict a significant positive coefficient on (̂ * ). Consistent with H2, model 1 shows a highly significant positive coefficient on estimation risk (z-stat. = 3.27). 14 The effect of (̂ * ) in model 1 is also significant in terms of its economic magnitude. Holding all other variables constant at their mean values, the probability of auditor resignation nearly doubles from 1.2 percent to 2.0 percent, as (̂ * ) increases from its tenth percentile value to the ninetieth percentile.
Therefore estimation risk has a large impact on auditors' resignation decisions. In comparison, the likelihood of auditor resignation more than doubles, from 1.0 percent to 2.2 percent, as ̂ * increases from its tenth percentile value to the ninetieth percentile.
In model 2, we additionally control for an auditor's proprietary information about the risk of bankruptcy by including the ex post bankruptcy dummy variable (B). We continue to find that auditor resignations are positively associated with estimation risk (z-stat. = 3.00).
Results from the models of audit fees (H3) Table 7 reports the results for the audit fee models. In model 1, we regress the natural logarithm of audit fees on the point estimates of bankruptcy risk (̂ * ), their standard errors ( (̂ * )) , and the control variables. As expected, Table 7 finds a significant positive coefficient on the point estimates of bankruptcy (̂ * ) (t-stat. = 5.15). That is, auditors charge higher fees when companies have higher point estimates of bankruptcy risk.
[ INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] Next, we turn to our main variable of interest, (̂ * ). Under H3, auditors respond to higher estimation risk by charging higher audit fees. Thus we predict a significant positive coefficient on (̂ * ). Consistent with H3, model 1 shows a highly significant positive coefficient on estimation risk (t-stat. = 4.43). The effect of (̂ * ) in model 1 is also significant in terms of its economic magnitude. Ceteris paribus, we find that audit fees increase by 7.4 percent ($46,613), as (̂ * ) increases from its tenth percentile value to the ninetieth percentile. Therefore estimation risk has a significant impact on audit fees. In comparison, audit fees increase by 13.8 percent ($85,347) , as ̂ * increases from its tenth percentile value to the ninetieth percentile. The signs and significance of the control variables are consistent with prior audit fee research (e.g., Hribar et al. 2014) .
In model 2, we additionally control for the ex post bankrupcy dummy (B) and find that this does not affect our infereneces. We continue to observe that audit fees are positively associated with estimation risk (t-stat. = 4.41).
Supplementary analyses
In this section, we conduct several supplementary analyses. First, we address the concern that (̂ * ) might be capturing bankruptcy risk rather than estimation risk. Second, we show that estimation risk ( (̂ * ) ) has a bigger effect on auditor behavior when companies are moderately distressed, rather than healthy or severely distressed. Third, we demonstrate that our results for ( (̂ * )) are driven by the squared normalized values of the X variables rather than time-varying estimates of the variance-covariance matrices. Fourth, we show that our findings for ( (̂ * )) are not attributable to the X variables having nonlinear effects on bankruptcy. Finally, we demonstrate that the results hold for both Big Four and non-Big Four auditors.
Is SE(B * ) capturing bankruptcy risk?
A concern is that our estimation risk variable ( (̂ * )) might be inadvertently capturing misspecification of the bankruptcy prediction model. In particular, we want to be sure that (̂ * ) is not capturing the effects of bankruptcy risk. To examine this, we include (̂ * ) in the bankruptcy prediction model. If SE(B * ) is inadvertently capturing bankruptcy risk rather than estimation risk, we would expect to find significant positive coefficients on SE(B * ) in the bankruptcy prediction model.
The results are reported in Table 8 . We find that estimation risk (̂ * ) is an insignificant predictor of bankruptcy (z-stats. = 0.41, 0.60). In contrast, the point estimates of bankruptcy are highly significant predictors (z-stats. = 9.24, 9.13). These findings confirm that the point estimates are capturing bankruptcy risk, while the standard errors are capturing estimation risk rather than bankruptcy risk.
[ INSERT TABLE 8 HERE] 5.2 Does estimation risk ( (̂ * )) matter more when companies are moderately distressed?
We expect that (̂ * ) matters more when companies are moderately distressed, compared to when they are financially healthy or severely distressed. Estimation risk is less important when a company is severely distressed (i.e., when ̂ * is very large) because, in this situation, the auditor would likely issue a going-concern opinion, resign, or exert more audit effort, even if the point estimates of bankruptcy are measured with a high degree of imprecision.
Similarly, estimation risk is unlikely to matter much when a company is financially healthy because, in this situation, the auditor would be unlikely to issue a going-concern opinion, resign, or exert greater audit effort, regardless of the imprecision in the point estimates of bankruptcy.
Instead, we expect that (̂ * ) matters more when the point estimates (̂ * ) indicate a moderate level of financial distress because, in this situation, an auditor is likely to worry more about the degree of imprecision in the estimates.
To examine this, we re-estimate our going-concern, resignation, and audit fee models for the following three subsamples: i) financially healthy observations (i.e., ̂ * is less than the 50th percentile value),
ii) moderately distressed observations (i.e., ̂ * exceeds the 50th percentile value but is less than the 80th percentile value), and iii) highly distressed observations (i.e., ̂ * exceeds the 80th percentile value).
The results for these subsamples are shown in Table 9 . Consistent with expectations, we find that (̂ * ) is a highly significant determinant of auditors' GC reports, resignations, and audit fees in the subsample of moderately distressed observations. In contrast, (̂ * ) is generally insignificant in the other two subsamples. These findings reinforce our main result that auditors act conservatively in situations where (̂ * ) is likely to matter most.
[ INSERT TABLE 9 HERE] 5.3 The source of variation in (̂ * )
The estimation risk variable is equal to the square root of ̂̂ ′, where the n subcript denotes the n'th observation in the sample, is a vector containing the values of the X variables, and ̂̂ is the estimated variance-covariance matrix of the coefficient estimates. In our main tabulated tests, there are two sources of variation in (̂ * ). First, the value of (̂ * ) for observation n depends on the squared distances between the values of the X variables for observation n and the mean values of the X variables. Second, there is also some time variation in the estimates of ̂̂ and ̂ because the bankruptcy prediction models are estimated using rolling windows.
We expect that our results for (̂ * ) are driven by the variation in X, rather than the time variation in the estimated variance-covariance matrices. For example, if two companies have the same point estimates of bankruptcy (̂ * ), but one point estimate is driven by average X values and the other is driven by more extreme X values that offset each other (e.g., abnormally large losses but abnormally low leverage), the latter point estimate would have greater estimation risk than the former point estimate. Auditors would thus be more conservative for the latter observation.
To determine that it is the variation in X variables that drives our results (rather than the time-varying variance-covariance matrices), we re-estimate a single bankruptcy model using one pooled sample to ensure that the estimated variance-covariance matrix is held constant over the sample period. We then re-compute the values of ̂ * and (̂ * ) and plug them back into our equations for auditors' going-concern reports, resignations, and audit fees. We continue to find that the standard errors of the point estimates of bankruptcy are positive and significantly associated with going-concern opinions (z-stat. = 10.27), resignations (z-stat. = 2.98), and audit fees (t-stat. = 3.03). Moreover, the point estimates of bankruptcy also retain highly significant positive coefficients in each of the three models (z-stats = 18.29, 4.07; t-stat.
= 5.41).
Estimating a nonlinear bankruptcy model
Given that the estimation risk variable reflects abnormal or unusual values of the X variables, it is important to verify that our results are not driven by omitted nonlinear effects of the X variables. To some extent this concern is alleviated by the additional analysis of Section 5.1, which shows that (̂ * ) is not simply capturing bankruptcy risk. As an additional robustness test, we re-estimate the bankruptcy models after adding the squared values of all the continuous X variables as extra covariates. We then re-estimate ̂ * and (̂ * ) and plug these variables into our models for going-concern opinions, resignations, and audit fees. We continue to find that the standard errors of the point estimates of bankruptcy ( (̂ * )) are significantly and positively associated with going-concern opinions (z-stat. = 9.88), resignations (z-stat. = 3.08), and audit fees (t-stat. = 5.71). Moreover, the point estimates of bankruptcy, which are now a nonlinear function of the X variables, also remain highly significant in each of the three models (z-stats. = 16.13 and 3.54; t-stat. = 4.56).
The Big Four and non-Big Four audit firms
Next, we examine whether the Big Four and non-Big Four audit firms respond differently to estimation risk. A differential response would be expected if Big Four and nonBig Four auditors have different attitudes toward risk. The more risk averse the auditor, the greater the effect of estimation risk on auditor conservatism. A priori, it is unclear whether the Big Four or non-Big Four auditors are more averse to risk. On one hand, the Big Four auditors may be more risk averse because they have more reputational capital at stake and deeper pockets (DeAngelo 1981; Weber et al. 2008) . If so, they would be more sensitive to estimation risk than the non-Big Four. On the other hand, the Big Four may be less risk averse because their portfolios of clients are more highly diversified (Francis and Krishnan, 2003) . Thus it is an open empirical question whether the Big Four and non-Big Four auditors are equally sensitive to estimation risk.
To examine this, we estimate the going-concern, resignation, and audit fee models separately for both groups. Consistent with the pooled results, we find significant positive coefficients on SE(̂ * ) in both subsamples (results untabulated). Moreover, we find no significant difference in the coefficients on SE(̂ * ) between Big Four and non-Big Four auditors for the going-concern and resignation models. However, we find that Big Four auditors place a significantly higher weight on SE(̂ * ) in our audit fee regressions.
Conclusions
Estimation risk imposes incremental uncertainty on risk-averse individuals and therefore affects their behavior. We examine how estimation risk affects auditors' goingconcern reports, their resignation decisions, and audit fees. We demonstrate that auditors are more likely to issue going-concern opinions when the point estimates of bankruptcy are estimated with greater imprecision. Additionally, auditors have a greater propensity to resign when the point estimates of bankruptcy have bigger standard errors. Finally, we show that auditors charge higher fees when faced with higher estimation risk surrouding the point estimates of bankruptcy. These findings are consistent with estimation risk helping explain auditor behavior. In particular, our findings suggest that auditors are more conservative when they face greater estimation risk.
These findings matter because decision-making under uncertainty is a key theme of accounting research. We have demonstrated that it is simple to compute estimation risk using the variance-covariance matrix of coefficient estimates and to then examine how this risk affects the behavior of risk-averse individuals. This study's methodology for measuring estimation risk can be used in other accounting settings, where the decisions of risk-averse individuals are likely to be affected by estimation risk.
Fig. 1
The utility function of a risk-averse auditor.
= the losses incurred by an auditor when a client files for bankruptcy.
The probability of bankruptcy is either p1 or p2. The above figure assumes a 50:50 chance that p1 is the true probability of bankruptcy and a 50:50 chance that p2 is the true probability of bankruptcy. The auditor does not know whether the true probability is p1 or p2 and so the auditor faces estimation risk.
Fig. 2
The distribution of estimated bankruptcy risks for company Z and company Y and their impact on the utility of a risk-averse auditor.
Company Y and company Z are assumed to have the same point estimates of bankruptcy risk (̂ * ), but company Z has a higher standard error for its point estimate than company Y.
̂ * = the point estimates of bankruptcy risk for company Y and company Z.
= the density function of company Z (where Z's point estimate is assumed to have a standard error of 1.50, i.e., SE(̂ * ) = 1.50).
= the density function of company Y (where Y's point estimate is assumed to have a standard error of 1.00, i.e., SE(̂ * ) = 1.00). LCLZ = the lower confidence limit of bankruptcy risk for company Z, at the two-tailed 95% confidence level (LCLZ = ̂ *  1.96 × 1.50). UCLZ = the upper confidence limit of bankruptcy risk for company Z, at the two-tailed 95% confidence level (UCLZ = ̂ * + 1.96 × 1.50). LCLY = the lower confidence limit of bankruptcy risk for company Y, at the two-tailed 95% confidence level (LCLY = ̂ *  1.96 × 1.00). UCLY = the upper confidence limit of bankruptcy risk for company Y, at the two-tailed 95% confidence level (UCLY = ̂ * + 1.96 × 1.00). ΔU1 is the change in auditor utility associated with a change in the expected loss, ΔE(Loss1). ΔU2 is the change in auditor utility associated with a change in the expected loss, ΔE(Loss2). Variable definitions B = one if the company files for bankruptcy within 15 months of the company's fiscal year-end, zero otherwise. GC = one if the company receives a going-concern modification in the auditor's report, zero otherwise. RESIGN = one if the auditor resigns from the company, zero otherwise. The sample period is 2000-2013; n = 51,882. Notes: LMV = Log of market value. LEVERAGE = Total debt divided by total assets. LOSS = one if the company reports a loss in the current year, zero otherwise. ROA = Net income divided by total assets. LIQUIDITY = Current assets divided by current liabilities. RET = Buy-and-hold raw return over the fiscal year. STDEV = Standard deviation of returns over the fiscal year. AGE = Natural log of company age. INSTOWN = Institutional ownership. DD = Distance to default calculated using the approach outlined by Bharat and Shumway (2008) . The financial ratio and returns variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% percentiles to address outlier issues. The sample period is 1995-2013; n = 79,393. Notes: B = 1 if the company files for bankruptcy within 15 months of the company's fiscal year-end and 0 otherwise.
estimate of * , which is estimated using the coefficients from the bankruptcy prediction models reported in Table 3 Table 3 ); etc. Estimation risk is measured using (̂ * ), which is the standard error of ̂ * . The sample period is 2000-2013; n = 51,882. Notes: GC = 1 if the company receives a going-concern modification in the auditor's report and 0 otherwise. * ≥ 0 if GC = 1, * < 0 if GC = 0. ̂ * = the company's point estimate of bankruptcy risk, where the point estimates are generated from the bankruptcy prediction models reported in Table 3 .
(̂ * ) = estimation risk, measured as the standard error of ̂ * . See Tables 1 and 2 for the definitions of control variables.
The sample period is 2000-2013. The standard errors are corrected for clustering on each company and heteroskedasticity. ***, **, * = statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively (twotailed). Notes: RESIGN = 1 if the auditor resigns from the company and 0 otherwise. * ≥ 0 if RESIGN = 1, * < 0 if RESIGN = 0. ̂ * = the company's point estimate of bankruptcy risk, where the point estimates are generated from the bankruptcy prediction models reported in Table 3 .
The sample period is 2000-2013. The standard errors are corrected for clustering on each company and heteroskedasticity. ***, **, * = statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively (twotailed). Notes: LnAF = natural logarithm of audit fees. ̂ * = the company's point estimate of bankruptcy risk, where the point estimates are generated from the bankruptcy prediction models reported in Table 3 . (̂ * ) = estimation risk, measured as the standard error of ̂ * . See Tables 1 and 2 for the definitions of control variables.
The sample period is 2000-2013. The standard errors are corrected for clustering on each company and heteroskedasticity. ***, **, * = statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively (twotailed). Notes: B = 1 if the company files for bankruptcy within 15 months of the company's fiscal year-end and 0 otherwise. * ≥ 0 if B = 1, * < 0 if B = 0. ̂ * = the company's point estimate of bankruptcy risk, where the point estimates are generated from the bankruptcy prediction models reported in Table 3 .
(̂ * ) = the standard error of ̂ * . See Tables 1 and 2 for the definitions of control variables.
The sample period is 2000-2013. The standard errors are corrected for clustering on each company and heteroskedasticity. ***, **, * = statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively (twotailed).
Table 9
Results after partitioning the sample into financially healthy observations, moderately distressed observations, and severely distressed observations. An observation is classified as financially healthy if its predicted bankruptcy probability is less than the median. An observation is classified as moderately distressed if its predicted bankruptcy probability is greater than the median but less than the 80 th precentile. An observation is classified as severely distressed if its predicted bankruptcy probability is greater than the 80 th percentile. 
